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INTRODUCTION

Practicing lawyers counsel clients daily both as to past events that
have unfortunately ripened into present problems, and present events
that eventually may ripen into future problems. Lawyers, by virtue
of their education, practical experience, and position in society, attract
people who seek advice on a multiplicity of problems. Although a
lawyer's counseling efforts generally are focused on legal issues, clients
frequently seek legal advice on business and personal matters. Notwithstanding the substantial time they devote to client counseling,
lawyers generally lack any formal education in the art of counseling.
Instead, lawyers learn to counsel through on-the-job training.,
It is for this reason, among others, that practitioners should embrace articles like Professor Thomas Morgan's Thinking About
Lawyers as Counselors2as providing insightful analysis of the lawyer's
role as counselor. Whether we agree with Professor Morgan's "alternative paradigm,1 s or for that matter with what he describes as the
"current dominant paradigm,

'4

is not important. Rather, the process

*© 1990. Rutledge R. Liles.

**Partner, Baumer, Bradford, Walters & Liles, Jacksonville, Florida. B.A. 1964, Florida
State University; J.D. 1966, University of Florida College of Law. The author served as an
Executive Editor of the University of Florida Law Review. In addition, the author is a past-President of The Florida Bar (1988-1989) and is a Board Certified Civil Trial Lawyer.
1. There are perhaps as many different counseling "styles" or philosophies as there are
lawyers. Considering the control that a lawyer has over the life of the client, the impact that
counseling may have, and the opportunity for intentional or unintentional abuse, law schools
should be encouraged to intensify efforts in developing counseling skills and a basic understanding
of human psychology.
2. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REv. 439 (1990).
3. Id. at 445.
4. Id. at 441-42.
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of reviewing and analyzing various counseling themes increases our
knowledge of client counseling and the responsibility that accompanies
the role of counselor. This process hopefully will translate into a better
understanding of how we may professionally and responsibly fulfill
the obligations of counselor.
An appreciation of the perceived role of law and the lawyer in
society is necessary in order to address adequately the role of the
lawyer as counselor or to effectively examine the attorney-client relationship in terms of an ethical balance between responsibility to the
system and the client 5 on the one hand and client expectations 6 on the
other. We, as lawyers, need to understand fully what our clients and
potential clients think of us, what we do and the system we serve, in
order to understand better what is expected of us as we discharge
the responsibilities of our role. How clients view us affects the attitude
with which they enter the counseling process which, in turn, influences
how they respond to what we may offer in the way of problem-solving
advice. 7 In approaching the counseling process, first we must examine
the traditional concept of law for I believe that it is within this concept
of law that we find the purpose that justifies and guides us in fulfilling
the obligations of our profession.
Some believe that law is an exercise of power rather than a restraint on power.8 Others view it as an "authoritative canon of value."
I think of law as a means of reconciling and regulating, yet still preserving and protecting, people's diverse desires and expectations. °

5. These responsibilities parallel one another and require that the lawyer act ethically and
professionally in the client's best interest. The lawyer's responsibility to the public, however,
rises above his responsibility to his client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
preamble (1983).
6. To obtain what clients envision is due them, if not more.
7. Clients generally enter the legal process unwillingly and as a last resort. They have
long-standing, possibly inaccurate, opinions about lawyers. Clients generally believe that lawyers
are concerned more with furthering their own interests rather than those of the client. Accordingly, the counseling process begins in a negative atmosphere fraught with suspicion.
8. R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 46 (1951).
9. Id.
10. Interestingly, revolutionaries and utopians often are committed to the belief that they
can manage better without law, lawyers, or the courts. Examples of this attitude abound. In
developing third world countries we often read of the disregard for constitutions, the imposition
of martial law, and of the assassination of judges to make room for the "new order." Mao
Tse-Tung abolished law schools and the legal profession as part of Communist China's revolutionary process. Address by Li Mei Chin, Professor, Peking University Law School, Beijing, China,
Inns of Court Banquet, Jacksonville, Florida (April 1987). People continue to delight in the cry
of one of Jack Cade's rebels: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." W. SHAKESPEARE,
KING HENRY VI, Part II, Act IV, scene ii. Cited out of context it is the rallying cry of our
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As the philosopher Aristotle so aptly stated, "Law is order, and good
law is good order."
Perhaps Dean Roscoe Pound's Justice According to Law,1 a scholarly and compelling treatise, contains the best discussion of "law."
According to Dean Pound:
Law is more than an aggregate of laws. It is what makes
laws living instruments of justice. It is what enables courts
to administer justice by means of laws; to restrict them by
reason where the lawmaker exceeds his reason, and to develop them to the full scope of the reason where the lawmaker falls short of it.'2
[Law] presupposes a life measured by reason, a legal order
measured by reason, and a judicial process carried on by
applying a reasoned technique to experience developed by
reason and reason tested by experience. 13
How then do laypersons view law? They view it as power; as
regulatory; as mystifying and perplexing; as confusing and contradictory; as often inequitable and, more often than not, as frightening,
intimidating, and unworthy of trust. 14 And how do laypersons view
lawyers? They view them as powerful instruments of the mystique,
as manipulative controllers of human events, as an unfortunate necessary evil in society and, as with law, with a full measure of distrust.15
As pragmatists schooled through ideals, as peacemakers tempered
through disputes, and as professionals challenged by change, we as
lawyers instinctively recognize that we are a unique group. We are
educated in applying a "reasoned technique to experience developed
by reason and reason tested by experience."' 6 Others look to us for

profession's detractors. When viewed in the context of the event where the words were uttered,
it is frightening;, kill the lawyers, close the courts, abolish the system of justice - a splendid
anarchy, but an orderless society.
11. R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW (1951).
12. Id. at 60.
13. Id. at 91.
14. I recently saw a bumper sticker - author unknown - bearing the phrase "Keep your
laws off of my body."
15. Not long ago, I monitored a series of nonlawyer focus groups on the public perception
of lawyers. Overall the participants exhibited a distrust for lawyers as a whole. Individually,
however, the participants expressed a favorable impression of attorneys arising from positive
personal experience concerning both effectiveness and cost. In fact, despite the general distrust
and negative feelings, when asked what the participants would prefer for their children as a
career choice, the majority favored the profession of law.
16. R. PoUND, supra note 8, at 91.
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direction as they attempt to cope with an ever changing and complex
society where people must weave their way through an increasing
mass of law often viewed as oppressive. Due to the special position
we occupy as lawyers, we are charged with a higher calling - to be
stewards of our system of justice. Trust in the law, trust in what
lawyers do, and trust in our system of justice is dependent entirely
upon our professional and positive response to that charge. Good
stewardship should be always in our minds as we fulfill the role of
lawyer-counselor. Why? Because the basis of good stewardship is the
individual's responsibility to manage life and property with proper
regard to the rights of others. Thus, we should counsel our clients to
strive toward this goal.
Why have I seemingly strayed from the topic at hand - lawyers
as counselors - to dwell momentarily on the traditional concept of
law and the public's perception of the law, lawyers, and our system
of justice? Because I believe that we cannot think of ourselves as
counselors in a vacuum. Before we can focus on counseling and develop
a theme regarding the function of the lawyer as counselor, we must
first define and understand the role of law and lawyers in society and
in our system of justice. We must appreciate the public perception of
law and lawyers, not only from the standpoint of our purpose but also
bearing in mind the public's expectations. We must accept the fact
that the lawyer is so important in the administration of justice that
a lawyer's responsibility to the public rises above any responsibility
to the client. "The very nature of our democratic process imposes on
[the lawyer] the responsibility to uphold democratic concepts regard'17
less of how they affect the case in hand.
It was once said about lawyers:
True, we build no bridges. We raise no towers. We construct
no engines. We paint no pictures - unless as amateurs for
our own principal amusement. There is little of all that we
do which the eye of man can see. But we smooth out difficulties; we relieve stress; we correct mistakes; we take up other
men's burdens and by our efforts we make possible the peaceful life of men in a peaceful state. 8
Those words eloquently express what it means to be a lawyer. We
are, or should be, resolvers of conflicts, relievers of stress, and correctors of mistakes.

17. Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 908 (Fla. 1949).
18. M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 3 (1967) (quoting John W. Davis in The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York 30 (pamphlet, 1958)).
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Some months ago, I read a book by Jack L. Sammons, Mercer
Law School faculty member, 19 entitled Lawyer Professionalism.20 In
his book, Sammons proposed a "professional ideal," wherein lawyers
would make it "possible for people to participate in a meaningful fashion in the resolution of their social disputes or in the prevention of
social disputes or both."' 21 According to Sammons, "[s]ervice to that

ideal of meaningful participation defines our profession and the moral
value of meaningful participation justifies it."'
Sammons defines 'meaningful participation" as the client's involvement in such a way that the client is an "author of his own life" 23 in
the dispute and has a certain degree of autonomy. Sammons recognizes
that people turn to lawyers in the first place because they are unable
to resolve their disputes on their own. Furthermore, clients recognize
that the legal system is far too complex for the average citizen to
understand without the specialized knowledge and skills that competent lawyers have gained through legal education.?
Consequently, when lawyers
are functioning as we should, that is, when we are trying
to reflect the person of the client, we assist the client in
exploring many alternative definitions of the problems; we
identify and develop the information needed to clarify those
definitions and to distinguish among them; we assist the
client's exploration of alternative solutions through a consideration of a very broad range of consequences for each solution, including legal consequences, moral consequences, social consequences, economic consequences, and psychological
consequences; and we assist in the evaluation of each solution
m
by clarifying client values and so forth.?
By providing an awareness of the alternatives and of concomitant
consequences, the lawyer increases the client's autonomy and the
client's ability to participate meaningfully in resolving disputes. Thus,
19. AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 716 (1990).
20.

J. SAMaMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1988).

21. Id. at 5-6. Lawyers lead their clients through the problem-solving and decisionmaking
process. Yet, according to Sammons, the lawyer and client do not start the process with a
solution. Id. at 11. Rather, the lawyer makes the client aware of the alternatives and of the
possible consequences of following a certain course of conduct. Id. at 9, 11. In all, lawyers make
it possible for people to participate in problem-solving and decisionmaking, but the level of
participation depends on what is important to the client. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at6,7,
25. Id. at 9.
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a lawyer who upholds the ideal of meaningful participation avoids
diminishing the client's ability or depriving the client of his participation in some autocratic or paternalistic manner.
If we accept the ideal of meaningful participation, then we must
determine whether our own behavior and attitudes serve that ideal.
This task requires each lawyer to take a personal inventory of his or
her actions and motives. Are the decisions we make and the actions
we take in our client's matter driven by competitiveness, profit, or
selfish goals? Or are we assisting the client to meaningfully participate
in resolving the conflict in the client's best interests? Do we have a
"scorched earth," win-at-all-cost mentality in adversarial situations,
even where the cost is to the client? Do we regularly encourage extravagant claims or unreasonable positions as a style of dealing with
other' lawyers and their clients? Do we, in the name of our clients,
manipulate the system? Are we insensitive to our clients as human
beings? Do we view each client simply as "just another case"? Do we
react with arrogance and indignity to client inquiries and insecurities?
Do we remember that what clients perceive and feel about the legal
process influences what they gain from it? Quite simply, are we honest,
forthright, and understanding with our clients as we struggle together
to resolve their conflict?
In fulfilling the role of lawyer-counselor, we must constantly remind
ourselves of the good we can do when we act ethically, morally, competently, compassionately, and professionally in our association with
our clients and others. A good lawyer is always learning - learning
changes in the law, new tools of the profession, and ever changing
aspirational professional ideals. Good lawyers assimilate these changes
into their lives for the ultimate good of clients and the good of the
legal system.
Thus far, I have reflected upon the concept of law and the lawyer's
place in society from the standpoint of role responsibility and expectations. My purpose in doing so has its genesis in the belief that we
cannot discuss the lawyer as counselor without a clear understanding
of the legal and emotional framework within which the lawyer operates. In what follows, I will offer a practitioner's views on how lawyers
should approach counseling.
II.

WHEN DOES THE LAWYER ACT AS A COUNSELOR?

By distinguishing counseling from advocacy, which deals with past
conduct, Morgan limits counseling to helping "a client deal with future
circumstances or events. ' ' 26 He does so on good authority, although
26.

Morgan, supra note 2, at 440.
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he readily recognizes that the distinction between advocacy and counseling is not precise.Y It is difficult for me to draw this past-future
distinction. While the distinction may have some validity as it relates
to legal "advice"' in the role of advocate,2 I find that lawyers regularly
serve as advisers-counselors, notwithstanding the role of advocate.
That is, lawyers regularly assist their clients in developing a course
of future conduct and relationships. The client may enter the office
of the lawyer in need of advocacy skills to deal with past conduct.
Once the engagement is undertaken, however, the lawyer must assume
many roles 0 While some may refer to the lawyer as "a limited-purpose
friend," 31 I am unaware of any reference to a 'lmited-purpose lawyer."
A client calls upon a lawyer to provide counseling regardless of
whether the lawyer is an advocate or an adviser.

III.

COMMENTS ON THE "CURRENT DOMINANT PARADIGM"

Morgan describes the work of several different writers as the "current dominant paradigm" employed for thinking about lawyers as counselors. 32 If I may summarize even further, the general theme that

runs throughout this paradigm is that "ordinary morality," rather than

27. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-3 (1981) (in dealing with
past conduct, the lawyer must take the facts as he finds them; by contrast, the lawyer dealing
with future conduct must serve as an adviser). This distinction is also drawn in L. BROWN &
E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS
at xix (1978); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1986).
28. I agree with Sammons that "[t]here is no such thing as pure legal advice." J. SAAIONS,
supranote 20, at 28.
29. I define "advice" as the giving of specific opinions by the lawyer to the client surrounding
rights and liabilities flowing from past conduct framed by a present controversy.
30. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702,
708-09 (1977). Morgan notes that "[a] lawyer occupies many roles, including those of personal
advisor, guardian, informal mediator, negotiator and litigator." Id.
31. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976). Fried notes:
How does a professional fit into the concept of personal relations at all? He is, I
have suggested, a limited-purpose friend. A lawyer is a friend in regard to the
legal system. He is someone who enters into a personal relation with you - not
an abstract relation as under the concept of justice. That means that like a friend
he acts in your interests, not his own; or rather he adopts your interests as his
own. I would call that the classic definition of friendship.
Id. at 1071.
32. Morgan, supra note 2, at 441-45 (primarily relying on the work of Professors Monroe
Freedman, Charlie Fried, Geoffrey Hazard, Warren Lehman, David Luban, Gerald Postema,
Robert Redmount, Murray Schwartz, Thomas Shaffer, William Simon, and Richard Wasserstrom).
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"role morality," should govern a lawyer's conduct. The focus is more
on individual and social justice than on client's rights within the
framework of existing law. Professor William Simon further explains
this theme by proposing lawyers should take those actions that "seem
most likely to promote justice. " According to Simon, a lawyer's professional commitment should be to "legal values" including what the
law ought to be. 4 Simon adds that "the appeal to individual autonomy
or right is not a sufficient basis for client loyalty. '"- Simon reasons
that this begs the question because one individual may preserve autonomy at the expense of another's.3 6 Just as Morgan has challenged
this way of thinking, so must I. It strikes me as utopian, impractical,
and categorical at best.
First, in the context of the attorney-client relationship, I must be
an advocate for my client. If I am unable to assume this role, either
because the case strikes me as being immoral or unjust, or because I
cannot muster the necessary enthusiasm, I must decline the engagement. If these elements are not apparent initially, then I must withdraw at the earliest practicable moment.
Second, having accepted the engagement, I owe my client my
absolute loyalty and enthusiasm. My role is not to mediate with the
goal of satisfying everyone's best interests. Nor am I responsible for
supporting some concept of what the law ought to be. 37 If I do not
like the law as it is and have some idea of what it "ought" to be, it
is my right to lobby for change. As a lawyer representing a client,
however, I function within the judicial branch of government, not the
legislative.
Finally, the writers have become obsessed with the concept of
"ordinary morality" versus "role morality" or "the adversary system
excuse."- Morality simply relates to the rightness or wrongness of
human behavior.39 While moral situations that qualify as black or white
certainly exist, most situations involving the morality of conduct are
varying shades of gray. 40 Accordingly, while it is appropriate to discuss

33. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
34. Id. at 1125.
35.
36.

HARV.

L.

REV.

1083, 1090 (1988).

Id.
Id.

37. My job is to achieve my client's goals in a lawful, professional, and ethical manner, not
to make sure that everyone is happy with the result. I work within the law as it presently is.
38. See supra note 32 (parenthetical noting some of these writers).
39. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 742 (8th ed. 1981).
40. Lawyers are drawn into situations that have a large element of factual and legal uncertainty about what has happened in the past or will happen in the future. This uncertainty results
in gray areas that make categorical compartmentalization of moral issues by a lawyer difficult,
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morality with the client during counseling, substituting one's own morality for the client's interferes with client autonomy and should be
avoided. Proper counseling includes a discussion of the rights of the
client in a given situation and the possible legal, moral, and practical
consequences of following a certain course.
Again, I want to emphasize that if I believe the client's cause is
so contrary to my sense of morality or justice that it affects my ability
to represent the client, I simply decline the engagement. However,
once involved, I do not act as a conscience, attempting to bring the
client to "my way of life" for the betterment of society. Rather, I
represent my client within the bounds of ethical standards and professionalism by employing lawful means to attain client goals. I leave it
to the judge or jury in the adversary setting, and opposing counsel
in the negotiation setting, to decide the merits of my client's position.
With these thoughts in mind, the reader should not be surprised
to learn that I have no moral indignation over counsel's statute of
limitations defense in Zabella v. Pakel.41 For me to conclude otherwise
would be a form of transactional morality. 42 The statute of limitations,
just as the statute of frauds, is a creature of the legislature. Lawmakers are representatives of the people, charged with carrying out the
will of the people. The legislature enacted statutes of limitation and
fraud with certain purposes in mind, and these purposes have survived
the test of time. If these statutes are against public policy or unjust
in their application, the legislature should repeal or amend them. If
not, then it is not immoral or unjust to advantageously call upon them
in given situations although in the minds of some their use may result
in an immoral or unjust result. Notwithstanding Morgan's factual elucidation, Zabella could have exercised certain legal rights that would
have obviated his ultimate dilemma. He could have reduced the obligation to writing and required nominal periodic payments to toll the
statute of limitations, or he could have reduced the debt to judgment
in a timely fashion. Even in the absence of "a way out" for Zabella,
4
however, the result was proper and the lawyer's conduct moral. 3 I

if not impossible. This, in turn, creates situational stress and ambivalence surrounding the
lawyer's role. Problem solving would be simple if we could polarize issues and behavior.
41. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957). Certainly a reader feels better about the result in light
of the additional facts supplied by Morgan. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 448-50. I believe the
result was valid even under the harsher statement of facts.
42. By 'transactional morality" I mean selective application of a law or legal procedure,
which application is a product of my own concept of what is right in a given situation.
43. I recently read of a lawsuit against the United States seeking to recover what was
described as a "1777 debt of honor." A wealthy Pennsylvania7 merchant apparently loaned the
Continental Congress $450,000 to rescue the troops at Valley Forge. The loan was in response
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know of no procedural statute or rule of law that guarantees absolute
justice in all circumstances.- It would be impossible to fashion such
a law. We must have law for order, and laws must be designed to do
the greatest good for the greatest number, even though they may, in
certain applications, result in public outcry that justice has not been
45
served.
Accordingly, I agree with Morgan's statement, "[T]he moral ambiguity in most contested matters is far greater than advocates of
subordinating law to morality often admit. '46 I adopt the philosophy
that the lawyer's role in the legal system is to help the client arrive
at independent decisions, thereby assuring autonomy. In fulfilling this
role, however, lawyers should be guided more by the lawfulness of
their conduct in the context of ethical guidelines and professionalism
than by their own judgment surrounding the morality of their clients'
actions. We are not the clients. We are the lawyers charged with
responsibly representing our clients to the very best of our abilities.
If this knowledge moves me from the realm of "ordinary morality" to
"role morality," then I accept the title as part of the job.

IV.

MORGAN'S "ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM"

If I were to take sides in a contest between Morgan and the writers
responsible for the "current dominant paradigm," I would side with
Morgan, but not without explanation and a few clarifying comments
on his alternative paradigm:

to a desperate plea in 1777 from George Washington, the Commander in Chief of the Continental
Army, when it looked as if the Revolutionary War was about to be lost. Depending upon how
interest is compounded, the loan carries a value of between $98.3 billion and $141.6 billion. No
one denies that the loan was made and remains unpaid, or that the war might have been lost
in its absence, yet the government has raised the statute of limitations as a defense. Lunaas
v. United States, No. 140-89c (Cl. Ct. 1989), appeal docketed, No. 90-5067 (Fed. Cir. May 22,
1990). Query how the advocates of subordinating law to morality would decide this case?
44. "Justice" is subject to various definitions depending entirely upon an individual's point
of view. "Justice means much more than the sort of thing that goes on in law courts. It is the
old name for everything we should now call 'fairness[;'] it includes honesty, give and take,
truthfulness, keeping promises, and all that side of life." C. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 62
(1952).
45. This comment could apply to our search and seizure laws, and other laws that occasionally
allow the "guilty" to go free. Law exists for a reason. Is it immoral for a lawyer to follow the
law? Do the moral considerations differ between a court-appointed lawyer forced to represent
an indigent with no opportunity to withdraw and a lawyer who voluntarily undertakes the case
for a fee, retaining the option of withdrawal, where each is faced with the conflict between a
personal morality and a duty to their client?
46. Morgan, supra note 2, at 450.
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1. Morgan asserts that the professional function of a lawyer is to
assist clients in complying with the law's requirements and to take
appropriate advantage of lawful opportunities. 47 I would change this
theme to read: "The function of a lawyer is to assist the client in
complying with the law and to take advantage of lawful opportunities."
Although some may view my changes as merely form over substance, I believe they simplify Morgan's theme without altering its
meaning. Moreover, the changes enhance the defensibility of Morgan's
theme. 48 Morgan's original terms "professional" and "appropriate" are
redundant and obfuscate the overall theme advanced with which theme
I agree entirely. As to my deletion of "professional," if lawyers are
professionals, which I like to think that they continue to be, they
function as professionals when they function as lawyers. 49 Therefore,
referring to the lawyer's "professional" function seems unnecessary to
the overall theme. What is important in the counseling context is that
the lawyer function ethically and professionally. In addition, I delete
the term "appropriate" because "lawful" opportunities would seem to
be "appropriate" in and of themselves. I am presuming that the lawyer
ensures client autonomy in each case by helping the client to take
advantage of lawful opportunities.
As we contrast this theme with that of the other writers', the use
of the term "appropriate" may well be definitional. By failing to acknowledge that all lawful opportunities are in fact appropriate, the
other writers may assert that, in a Zabella setting, taking advantage
of the statute of limitations may be a lawful opportunity but by no
means appropriate because it lacks morality. In my judgment, taking
advantage of a lawful opportunity is moral.
Carrying the theme, as restated, into actual practice, my clients
come to me because they anticipate a problem, have a problem, or
want to avoid a future problem2 ° I am the champion of their cause.

47. Id. at 445.
48. Over the past three years I have been involved in drafting uniform sanctions for lawyer
discipline, changes in the rules regulating a state bar and an aspirational code of professional

conduct. As a result of these experiences, I tend to reduce concepts to a "rule" format as
opposed to a general 'theme." In a "rule" format, they become more authoritative and, as

Morgan, I believe that "authoritative statements of ethical standards... serve an important
function." Morgan, supra note 2, at 451.
49. I do not mean to imply that a member of a profession will necessarily function in a
professional manner. In fact, the decline in professionalism may ultimately be the death knell
of the lawyer as a professional. But then that could serve as the topic of still another article.
50. See Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 331,
331 (1987). Monroe Freedman is much more poetic yet we essentially say the same thing: "[M]y
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Upon accepting representation, my function is twofold: First, I must
counsel my client in a manner that will maximize the client's autonomy
in reaching decisions consistent with the law and the client's desired
goals. Thereafter, I must aggressively act upon client decisions to
assure that these decisions are carried out.
Second, I must bear in mind that my responsibility to the public,
by virtue of the office of lawyer, may rise above my responsibility to
my client. That is, the very nature of our democratic process imposes
upon me the responsibility to uphold democratic concepts regardless
of how they may affect the case.
Are these responsibilities inconsistent with one another? Might
they, in and of themselves, present a conflict in the representation?
After all, am I not serving two masters: the client and the public? I
think not. A lawyer may serve the system while the system serves
the client. Professionalism and good lawyering are synonymous. One
can be a good lawyer and a good person at the same time.
Themes of justice and fundamental fairness are part of our training.
Accordingly, they should permeate our conscious and subconscious
thoughts as we represent our clients. When we perform as lawyers,
these themes should necessarily color the advice we give when we
counsel.
2. Morgan also proposes that the lawyer should not harm third
parties any more than is reasonably required in the service of the
client's legitimate interests. 51 In most cases, applying this theoryimposes a heavy burden upon the lawyer. How does the lawyer decide
when the harm done to third parties is more than that reasonably

client has come to me because he or she is suffering in some way or, at least, is trying to avoid
suffering." Id. I use the word "problem" because "suffering" is what my clients do when they
receive my bill.
51. Morgan, supra note 2, at 445.
52. No one would deny that vindictive or vengeful actions, without any other justification,
are improper. Yet vindictiveness and revenge are basic human emotions. A person who has been
wronged has every right to seek redress regardless of motivation, provided that the action also
is justified by the wrong the individual is attempting to correct. This concept is generally
covered by the attorney's oath of admission in one form or another. In Florida, the attorney's
oath reads in pertinent part:
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to
be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under
the law of the land; I will employ [in the process of representing my client] such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead
the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.
FLA. STAT. ANN. RULES Oath of Admission (1985) (emphasis added). The oath was originally
formulated by the Florida Supreme Court on January 27, 1941. It was revised to remove
gender-biased language.
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required to further the client's legitimate interests? Law is not an
exact science, and any theory based on the presumption that lawyers
know when enough is enough gives them more credit than they deserve. Righting a wrong through .legal action usually translates into
damages in one form or another. Similarly, gaining advantage through
negotiating carries with it the reward of achieving the better deal. I
have never placed righting a wrong or achieving a better deal on a
sliding scale of "harm" to the opposing party. Supposedly, our system
of advocacy has built-in checks and balances designed to align damages
with redress rather than harm, although redress in any form can cause
harm in certain situations.0
Prior to trial, attorneys should advise their clients of the value of
their claims with sufficient specificity to allow client autonomy in reaching a decision. If my opponent feels that I have crossed from reasonable
redress to unreasonable harm, I assume my opponent will tell me so,
reject my proposal, and offer a counterproposal. If, on the other hand,
my opponent's client is willing to pay me more than is necessary to
settle the claim, should I insist that he pay me less because I am
causing more harm than the legitimate interests of my client require?
Or should I take the proffered amount because (a) perhaps my expectations were unrealistically low or (b) my opponent knows more about
my case than I know and thinks that my settlement proposal is actually
a good deal for his client?
Assuming inability to negotiate a settlement and moving into the
trial stage, the buffer of a jury, judge, and appellate court exist to
decide what is reasonable redress versus disproportionate harm. Accordingly, checks and balances do exist to prevent a moral breakdown.
The legitimacy of my position extends to all aspects of law practice,
not just advocacy. In the negotiation process there are two sides, and
one must assume that the final product is a reasonable compromise
or else the parties would still be negotiating. The only flaw in that
assumption occurs when a party makes misrepresentations during negotiation. There the negotiated result is founded not upon a failure
to inquire but rather upon a withheld or an untruthful response. Under
those circumstances, however, the harm could be undone because the
offending attorney's fraud or deceit violates ethical, professional, and
legal standards.
Morgan's analogy in Spaulding v. Zimmerman5 begs the question .5 I really cannot see this as a counseling or conflict of interest
53. Minimal redress in the case of the uninsured may cause considerable harm to the
defendant whereas when passed on to the insurer it may have but minimal impact.
54. 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
55. Morgan, supra note 2, at 454-55.
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problem. Disclosing the patient's medical condition is a decision for
the lawyer and not an issue of client autonomy. Similarly, I would
not negotiate for "use immunity" for the information because it would
only create another conflict in the event opposing counsel refused to
grant the immunity. In that situation, should the lawyer refuse to
divulge the information? This is really a case of the public interest
transcending client interest, rather than a question of doing more
harm than the legitimate interests of the client require.
Realistically, however, I doubt that this dilemma would ever occur.
First, the Hippocratic Oath would require that the examining doctor
reveal the information; second, the examining doctor's written opinion
or his record of the exam probably would contain the information
thereby rendering it discoverable by either party. Finally, the party
requesting the independent medical exam should know from experience
that the report may not. be favorable, but the risk falls entirely upon
that party.- With this in mind, and in recognition that Sammons is
correct in saying that "[tihe search for some combination of truth and
justice is part of the function of the adversarial system, '57 I would
not hesitate to disclose unconditionally the adverse finding.
Lawsuits, especially complex lawsuits, tend to take on lives of their
own. I always caution young lawyers, and frequently remind myself,
that lawyers do not make the facts and must learn both to accept
them as they find them and to deal with them in the best possible
way. If the facts are untrue, they should be challenged. If they are
true, they should be accepted. Clients should be protected from harm
caused by the absence of truth, not its presence. To "get the plaintiff
the necessary surgery to repair the aneurism, but to do so in a way
that protects the lawyer's own client insofar as possible"- is to protect
the client from the truth, not from the absence of truth. Whether the
accident caused the aneurism is a legitimate question of fact for the
jury. The matter is one of redress, not "harm," in the sense that
withholding the truth may harm the client more than the truth itself.59
3. Finally, Morgan emphasizes that a "lawyer's professional judgment and advice to a client should reflect the empathy, respect, and
practical wisdom that the lawyer would offer a good friend."- My

56. I always caution my client that the downside risk of an independent medical exam is
that the examining doctor may submit a report less favorable than the treating physician.
57. J. SAMMONS, supra note 20, at 55.
58. Morgan, supra note 2, at 454.
59. "Harm" in the sense that good stewardship requires an individual to manage his life
and property with proper regard to the rights of others. The withholding of potentially life-saving
information would be poor stewardship not to mention the guilt that the withholder would suffer.
60. Morgan, supra note 2, at 445.
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clients are not my friends and I am not theirs. Rather, I am their
lawyer. Of course, the relationship may develop into a friendship, as
it occasionally does. But, friendship in its purest sense may cloud the
lawyer's objectivity. Furthermore, the client may lose a certain degree
of autonomy because the "friend" has everything under control and
will not let the client down. Realistically, our clients have fixed impressions of lawyers, and generally seek legal assistance as a last resort.
The lawyer's office is the last place most clients want to be because
this means they have entered an expensive legal twilight zone. Consequently, clients do not like or trust lawyers, although familiarity
may change their initial fixed impressions.
Morgan speaks metaphorically when he uses the term "friend."
What Morgan means, at least from my standpoint, is that we must
always remember that we are dealing with human beings and not just
"clients." Friends deal with one another on a level of full and honest
disclosure. They listen when they should listen and speak when they
should speak. It is through both silence and the spoken word that
friends learn to communicate real feelings. Lawyers should deal with
clients as they would with good friends. In the process, lawyers let
down their guards, exchange honest emotions with their clients, communicate real feelings, and explore the full range of legal alternatives
available to their clients. Through this kind of relationship, the client
is assured of autonomy in problem solving. Hopefully a fair measure
of justice will flow from the process.
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